Author: Natanael 2017-05-03 19:10:47
Published on: 2017-05-03T19:10:47+00:00
On May 3, 2017, Erik Aronesty proposed a solution to the high failure probabilities in nodes when an active attacker targets less commonly available blocks. He suggested that nodes could use the same mechanism as attackers to determine these blocks and choose to store a random percentage of them along with their deterministic random set. The proposal involves X blocks at the end of the chain, Y% deterministic random set, and Z% patch/fill set to deter attacks. However, the attacker could still use Sybil attacks to obscure what's actually rare and not. Proof of storage is not enough; proof of INDEPENDENT storage is required, which is essentially impossible. To address this issue, there needs to be a way of determining which nodes are run by the same people, such as counting all the AWS nodes as one.
Updated on: 2023-06-12T00:22:07.431332+00:00