Published on: 2015-05-12T18:55:05+00:00
In a discussion about the block rate in Bitcoin, Leo Wandersleb expressed his belief that a one-minute block target would not have substantial support due to the delay between pool/network and miner causing stale shares. However, he acknowledged that a one-minute block target could reduce payout variance and make bitcoin more accessible as a payment method. In response, Sergio pushed for near-instant payments and opposed any changes that move the balance towards the economically upper billion. He dismissed concerns about increased traffic from SPV and proposed small improvements in the wire protocol to reduce traffic two-fold.Sergio Lerner discusses how reducing block propagation time in the Bitcoin network can lead to centralization of mining pools and reduced security. He explains that while mining pool administrators would need to invest in server infrastructure to achieve lower latency and higher bandwidth, most mining pools are run at a loss and have nothing to invest. Additionally, reducing block propagation time only on average case is good but it has to be considered what will happen in the worst-case scenario. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices may require upgrading. Sergio also highlights that thousands of blocks mean more block headers, which increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets need to catch up with the chain.The article discusses the tradeoff between propagation speed gain and blockchain fork rate in smaller blocks in Bitcoin. The author strongly advises against increasing the block generation rate in Bitcoin as it would be a controversial proposal and would not solve anything. A response from Dave Hudson points out that blacklisting miners who engage in bad behavior is not effective because large-scale miners can easily make themselves look like many smaller-scale miners. Anonymity on behalf of transaction validators and block makers makes it almost impossible to maintain any sanctions against anti-social behavior.In a discussion regarding blacklisting on the Bitcoin network, it was suggested to ban miners who engage in bad behavior. However, this method is flawed because large-scale miners can disguise themselves as smaller miners, making it difficult to identify and blacklist them. Additionally, anonymity for validators and block makers makes it virtually impossible to maintain sanctions against antisocial behavior. The only deterrent is the lack of incentives for miners to engage in such activity.In a discussion about potential attacks on the Bitcoin network, it was asked how blacklisting would be implemented. The response given was that miners who engage in harmful behavior can simply be banned from mining. However, it was also mentioned that any attack by miners only lasts for 10 minutes before being stopped. Therefore, excessive worry about these types of attacks on the network is unnecessary.Sergio Lerner has outlined arguments against reducing the block interval, including concerns about centralization, blockchain splits, decreased speed and efficiency of block verification and transmission, insufficient testing and research into technical/economic implications, and the possibility of adding networking optimizations later.The issue of increasing server bandwidth to achieve a tenfold increase in work distribution has been discussed. Latency is the main issue, with up to 15 seconds between the first and last pools to push headers to clients for the latest block. Some pools do not validate blocks but mirror other pools, making this an epidemic of invalidity rather than a solution. It is unclear whether there is even a single study of the stale rates within proof-of-work cryptocurrencies with lower than 1-minute block intervals like Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Quarkcoin.The email proposes that reducing the block rate to 1 minute can be a better way to increase transactions/second than increasing the maximum block size. The author argues against several arguments for not reducing the block interval, including concerns about centralization, blockchain splits, security, and technical/economic implications. The author suggests that lowering the block rate can decrease the probability of block competition, and the decrease in security is only if participants wish to decrease it. The email provides evidence and research to back up these claims. The author also suggests that upgrades to SPV wallets and optimizations to the protocol can help reduce the impact on mobile devices and bandwidth. The email concludes that there have been insufficient testing and research into reducing the block rate but argues that the changes required are minor compared to other proposals. The email encourages consideration of reducing the block rate as opposed to increasing the block size through miners voting.The email argues that increasing the maximum block size is not the best way to increase transactions per second in Bitcoin. The author suggests decreasing the block rate to 1 minute while keeping the block size limit to 1 megabyte or increasing it from a lower value such as 100 kilobytes. The author backs up their claims with many hours of research simulating the Bitcoin network under different conditions. The email addresses and responds to arguments against reducing the block interval, including the potential for centralization, an increased probability of a blockchain split, decreased security, and insufficient testing. The email concludes that there are no good arguments against lowering the block rate.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T12:38:15.225257+00:00