Published on: 2015-05-08T03:12:22+00:00
In an email exchange between Pieter Wuille and Roy Badami, the two discuss the risks and implications of implementing a hard fork in the Bitcoin network. Pieter argues that a hard fork is only safe if all economically relevant users upgrade, while Roy believes that requiring a supermajority of miners for a hard fork to proceed is a wise precaution. They also touch on the potential power of users to change the hash function or freeze transactions in extreme circumstances.Pieter states that he would not modify his node if a change introduced a perpetual 100 BTC subsidy per block, even if 99% of miners went along with it. Roy responds by saying that in this scenario, Bitcoin would be dead and vulnerable to a 501% attack if the fork had only 1% of the hash power. He emphasizes the need to convince people and ensure that they modify their code before making any changes to the Bitcoin system.The conversation, shared on the Bitcoin-development mailing list, delves into the risks associated with a hard fork. Pieter argues that a hashrate-triggered hard fork does not make sense as it is risky regardless of whether the hashrate upgrades. Roy questions the plausibility of a scenario where 99% of miners vote for a hard fork, but the economic majority votes to stay on the old blockchain, given the significant drop in hashrate and block time. They also discuss the potential for users to change the hash function or freeze transactions in extreme situations.Another thread on the Bitcoin-development mailing list sees Pieter stating that he would not modify his node if a change introduced a perpetual 100 BTC subsidy per block, even if 99% of miners agreed. Someone else responds by suggesting that such a scenario would lead to the death of Bitcoin and vulnerability to a 501% attack. Pieter emphasizes that a hard fork is safe when all economically relevant users upgrade, and requiring a supermajority of miners is a wise precaution. They also discuss the possibility of miners upgrading at a different schedule than the rest of the network.The context highlights the importance of consensus among miners, merchants, and users for a successful hard fork in the Bitcoin network. While a supermajority of 75% miners is sufficient, near-total consensus is required from merchants and users. If there is a significant split in support, it can result in blockchain stalls. The author suggests that before considering any hard fork proposal, there needs to be rough consensus on the level of supermajority required. Various proposals have been made, ranging from 99% to 80% of miners. The author believes that a supermajority of approximately 97.2% (35/36th) of miners is the minimum needed to avoid forking Bitcoin into two competing coins.Overall, the context provides insights into the risks and implications of implementing a hard fork in the Bitcoin network. It emphasizes the need for consensus among miners, merchants, and users, and the importance of convincing people to modify their code.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T12:24:23.514689+00:00