blind symmetric commitment for stronger byzantine voting resilience (Re: bitcoin taint & unilateral revocability)



Summary:

The conversation is about a proposal made by Adam, which is similar to the "guy fawkes" protocol proposed by Zooko. In a guy fawkes signature, users use the commitment to hide the preimage that proves they have authority to spend a coin. Adam's proposal suggests using this method to hide which coin is being spent. However, there are anti-DOS complications which Adam claims can be avoided by mixing blinded and unblinded inputs. This means that as long as one can convince the network to let them spend some coins, they can also spend other coins along for the ride without the network knowing which ones until it's too late. There are strange economic implications to this proposal, as a blinded payment would seem to have a different utility level to an unblinded one. Blinded payments cannot be used for fees, but they can be unblinded at any time. The two types of inputs and the possibility of mining gibberish could create awkward situations, though it may not affect data storage if the preimage solution is implemented. More time is needed to fully understand the implications of this proposal.


Updated on: 2023-05-19T16:58:35.997888+00:00