Author: Peter Vessenes 2012-05-25 14:00:09
Published on: 2012-05-25T14:00:09+00:00
The email thread discusses various solutions to address the issue of botnet owners who are motivated by economic reasons. It is mentioned that it takes a lot of effort to ensure merkleing and keeping up-to-date, and that it is easier to get an 80 byte header from a central server and re-calculate a single transaction merkle client-side. However, the extra work required to keep track of what version of getmemorypool output is being received in a broadly distributed pool makes this process more difficult. The author suggests that economic solutions are needed to make 'cheater' blocks less valuable or to increase the value of transactions.It is also suggested that increasing the transaction fee subsidies to 25 btc per block may not necessarily impact botnet operators as they likely care about fiat currency. The email thread then goes on to discuss the possibility of an express-delivery mining service that provides faster certification for those adding a transaction fee of 1 btc. The email notes the importance of understanding how to deal with griefers who control massive resources (compute or gold-farmers) and suggests changing the difficulty calculations to just ignore 1tx blocks as one possible solution.The email thread continues with a discussion of a simple proof of work test that asks miners for a random old transaction, which would allow an estimate of whether it is a chainless miner. However, it is noted that this solution would only work if every node connected to the miner enforces the rule, and individual miners would have an advantage building off antisocial blocks because they only need to produce one to create the longest chain while the miners following the rules need two blocks.
Updated on: 2023-06-06T04:43:57.776749+00:00