Published on: 2023-03-01T17:17:58+00:00
In a bitcoin-dev mailing list, Rastislav Budinsky proposed a solution where miners would only take a fraction M of the transaction fees, while the remaining fraction C would be sent to contracts for redistribution. However, Dave pointed out that miners can profit from confirming transactions through alternative means, such as "out-of-band fees". He explained that if consensus rules were changed to require each miner to pay a percentage of its in-band fees to future miners, it would incentivize miners to prefer out-of-band fees that wouldn't be subject to this redistribution scheme. This could potentially prevent the effective redistribution of fees as proposed by Rastislav's solution. Additionally, discussions on the mailing list have revealed that larger miners have an advantage over smaller miners in collecting miner-specific fee payments, which undermines the decentralization of Bitcoin's transaction confirmation mechanism.A Bachelor's thesis introduces a proposal to change the way transaction fees are collected and distributed in Bitcoin mining. The proposal suggests taking only a fraction of the fees while sending the rest to contracts for redistribution back to the miner in a "smarter" way. This approach aims to increase security and predictability against fluctuations in fees. However, the proposal has some flaws, including the possibility of undercutting attacks and challenges in achieving miner consensus. The lack of references to op_codes or implementations in the paper makes it unclear how the smart contract would be constructed. Nevertheless, the proposal offers a potential solution to address long-term miner incentives when block subsidies run out.The writer of the Bachelor's thesis proposes a new method of distributing transaction fees, where miners would take a fraction M of the fees, and the remaining fraction C would be sent to contracts for redistribution back to the miner. This approach aims to make mining more secure and predictable against significant fee fluctuations. The benefits of this proposal are discussed, highlighting a better mining environment. However, there are several challenges with the proposal, including the difficulty in constructing the smart contract and convincing the ecosystem to shift from a competitive to a cooperative mining incentive structure. The paper also notes an error in describing the distribution in block creation, which should be poisson instead of exponential. Further discussion is needed to achieve miner consensus and implement the fee-redistribution scheme effectively.The writer is working on their Bachelor's thesis, presenting a new approach to collecting transaction fees. Under this proposal, miners would only take a fraction M of the fees, while the remaining fraction C would be sent to contracts for redistribution back to the miner. This solution aims to enhance mining security and predictability regarding fee fluctuations. The benefits of the proposal are discussed, arguing that most miners should not oppose it as it creates a better mining environment. However, there are challenges highlighted in the paper, such as the difficulty in constructing the smart contract and persuading the ecosystem to transition from a competitive to a cooperative mining incentive structure. Furthermore, the paper acknowledges the need for further discussion on achieving miner consensus and implementing/updating the fee-redistribution scheme effectively. The writer also suggests considering a generally spendable script and embedding the correct logic into consensus nodes as a less disruptive alternative to a hard fork. The full paper can be accessed at [1].
Updated on: 2023-08-02T09:01:47.251880+00:00