Author: pushd 2022-03-12 17:11:29
Published on: 2022-03-12T17:11:29+00:00
The context is a discussion about the mechanism of soft-forking against activation and the potential for a miner cartel to enforce rules that users do not want. The speaker argues that creating a fork to cater to a hypothetical group of users who may or may not exist is not reasonable, and invites those who think otherwise to create such a fork themselves. They express a desire for BIP 8 and less invitations to fork or provoke people. The speaker also mentions that they could refuse to upgrade their node if they believe they are in the economic majority, but questions why this option was dismissed. They argue that there is no effective difference between developers releasing a malicious soft-fork and miners releasing a malicious version themselves, and that a miner cartel may not be polite enough to give a transparent signal of their new rules. The discussion touches on the fact that miners get paid irrespective of rules as long as subsidy doesn't change, and that affecting their fees and Bitcoin should be considered an attack on Bitcoin. However, without the economic majority enforcing their set of rules, the cartel continuously risks falling apart from the temptation of transaction fees of the censored transactions. The speaker notes that even in a censorship-resistant network, transaction fees aren't as expected, and if a cartel of developers affects it in the long term, there will be a time when nobody wants to mine for loss or less profit.In conclusion, the speaker emphasizes that one cannot have the perfect system of money all by themselves and that collaboration and compromise are necessary.
Updated on: 2023-06-15T18:00:00.229535+00:00