Response to Rusty Russell from Github



Summary:

The discussion revolves around the activation logic for Taproot. While Speedy Trial (ST) is not the final word on activation logic, BIP8 with LOT configuration does not formalize how economic nodes send a network-legible signal ahead of a chain split. The author argues that a regular flag day, with no signaling but communally released and communicated openly, most likely achieves the goal of providing users choice. However, it is unlikely that there will be consensus on an improved long-term process anytime soon. The author also makes the case that ST meets the desired triumvirate as well as BIP8 with configurable LOT and proposes a three-step process where developers release but do not activate, miners signal, and users may override by compiling and releasing a patched Bitcoin with moderate changes that activates Taproot at a later date. The author believes that this process is simpler and safer than a configurable LOT because there is no time-based consensus sensitivity on when LOT must be set, no missed window if users don't coordinate on setting LOT before the final period, and ST fails fast, permitting users ample time to prepare an alternative release. The argument against tying improvements together is also discussed, where it is believed that other improvements should stand or fall on their own merits. Additionally, there are serious unresolved objections to BIP8 in every possible deployment mode, including unnecessary chain split risk, risk of downtime for those running lot=true, and risk of reorgs/wipeout for those running lot=false. The author believes that significant improvements are needed. Lastly, the author suggests that once Taproot is squared away, there are other opportunities to improve activation methodologies such as great consensus cleanup, anyprevout, ctv, graftroot, annex-based block commitments, op_cat/covenants.


Updated on: 2023-06-14T19:51:49.366127+00:00