Author: Erik Aronesty 2021-03-22 14:24:55
Published on: 2021-03-22T14:24:55+00:00
The argument that hashed public addresses provide meaningful quantum resistance is flawed when considering Bitcoin itself. Andrew Chow's article provides a strong case against the quantum utility of hashed public keys. Additionally, there are arguments against quantum computing itself and its inevitability. Planning for quantum computing should be limited to a provable and written ability to upgrade if necessary. The possibility of writing up a more official plan for Bitcoin to use zero-knowledge proofs to transition to quantum resistance is also discussed. There is debate about Taproot's safety protection against quantum. It's possible for the network to "pause" while a full quantum-safe fix is developed before Taproot, but with it, it could become an unrecoverable situation if QC goes online before having a full quantum-safe solution. Furthermore, we do not actually gain anything from Taproot in terms of security. Despite this, it should be fairly trivial to add a hash on top in an additional softfork to fix this issue. In addition to the points made by Mark Friedenbach, two more arguments are added in response to Pieter's argument. One is that so long as we have hash-based addresses as a best practice, we can continue to shrink the percentage of bitcoins affected through social efforts discouraging address use. Second, when/if quantum does compromise these coins, so long as they are neglected or abandoned/lost coins, it can be seen as equivalent to Bitcoin mining. It is recommended that anyone using Bitcoin read Mark's article, Luke's thoughts, and any other arguments on the topic, decide if this is a concern, and make their own posts accordingly. Although there are concerns about Taproot's safety protection against quantum, it is not considered a showstopper, and it has already moved on to the activation phase.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T19:33:30.327361+00:00