Inquiry: Transaction Tiering [combined summary]



Individual post summaries: Click here to read the original discussion on the bitcoin-dev mailing list

Published on: 2017-03-29T13:10:05+00:00


Summary:

In a recent email exchange on the bitcoin-dev mailing list, Martin Stolze questions the assumption that rational economic interest is the driving force behind all hash-power action in Bitcoin mining. He argues that even a small portion of hash power motivated by rational economic interest would validate the concept. Additionally, he refutes the claim that 100% of miners need to be honest, pointing out the distributed nature of the system. Tom Zander suggests taking the discussion to a different forum rather than spamming the dev list.The discussion centers around the concept of "miners as service providers" and providing additional choice to those who are affected by hash-power centralization. The idea is to have miners listen to the network instead of soliciting transactions directly from users, which can go against the peer-to-peer nature of the network. Two proposed methods for providing this service are creating segregated mempools managed by an authenticated third-party and directing mining fees to preferred miners. However, both methods have potential pitfalls that require attention.Bitcoin end-users want to support specific miners based on various factors such as political positions and physical location. Certain miners will naturally become preferred by users regardless of the involvement of the Bitcoin developer community. The recent language used by the ECB and drafts by the EU suggest a need for a way for commercial interest to transact in a regulated space. A proof-of-concept project called Preferred Miner, created by AJ West, aims to stimulate discussion on this issue.Tom Zander responds to a discussion about the authority of transaction processors (block generators) in Bitcoin. He argues that miners do not have authority to decide which transactions to mine or not; rather, they make economic decisions based on their incentives. The distribution of miners means that one miner cannot stop others from mining certain transactions. Concerns about transaction processors having arbitrary authority to discriminate participants are based on a misconception and are not applicable to the current Bitcoin protocol.In another email exchange, praxeology_guy argues that miners do not have authority as they compete for profit. Martin counters by stating that the process of acquiring block space does give miners power to decide over that particular space. Praxeology_guy admits that using miner signaling to determine whether SegWit should be activated was a mistake and proposes alternative methods involving more entities to activate SegWit in the future.The discussion also touches on the idea of transaction tiering, allowing users to choose where they transact. Currently, Bitcoin does not provide users with the ability to choose their place of business. The conversation explores the challenges and potential pitfalls of implementing this feature without compatibility issues or forks. The importance of clear and accurate terminology in Bitcoin is also highlighted.Overall, these discussions highlight the desire for users to have more choice in selecting miners or transaction processors. Various proposals and concepts are presented, but there are challenges that need to be addressed. The Bitcoin developer community is actively engaged in discussing these issues and exploring potential solutions.


Updated on: 2023-08-01T19:50:03.601698+00:00