Author: Troy Benjegerdes 2014-03-25 13:39:25
Published on: 2014-03-25T13:39:25+00:00
The author is skeptical about the idea of 'new key per transaction' as a way to mitigate side-channel attacks in ECDSA. They argue that this feature would be useful only if it's generalizable to other processor architectures. The author suggests developing an open-source hardware Bitcoin ASIC that does the crypto and stores private keys, which should have a public open-source hardware layout for verification purposes. They believe that de-prioritizing address re-use is not only bad privacy but also provides a social engineering/key leakage attack vector where someone can track down one's EMF generated by the bitcoin wallet when they receive money. The author discusses a few technical details related to storing private keys securely and avoiding timing side-channels. Finally, the author suggests building some open-source hardware to find out how much silicon this will cost.
Updated on: 2023-06-08T04:01:38.290261+00:00