Author: Billy Tetrud 2021-06-30 19:42:50
Published on: 2021-06-30T19:42:50+00:00
The discussion in this context is centered around a proposal to provide a middleground between BIP8 and BIP9. The author of the proposal requests a return to the topic of the proposal in the context of other existing deployment plans, such as flag days, BIP8, BIP9, and taproot's hybrid deployment, which have been discussed in relation to the proposal. Luke and Jorge have suggested that explicit signaling of opposition is unnecessary and that it is not necessary to avoid chain splits when there is any opposition. However, the author does not understand what either of them proposes that is better than using the proposed solution. Other philosophical discussions, such as who controls or defines Bitcoin, what happens during a deployment, and whether we should deploy based on miner signaling at all, have only been tenuously related to the proposal. Therefore, the author suggests branching off these discussions into a separate thread and reconnecting the current discussion with the proposal.In response to Jorge's comments, Billy Tetrud agrees that he would oppose a change to 1GB blocks no matter what other users or miners say. Billy Tetrud questions Jorge's advocacy for soft forks without miner support and highlights the associated costs of increased orphan rate and reorg rate. He also questions Jorge's stance on miner signaling in consensus rule change deployment, which seems to conflict with some of the things Jorge wrote in BIP99. Eric questions the use of the term "majority," and the author clarifies that by "economic majority," he means a set of users that presently accept more than 50% of the volume of payments in a given period of time.Jorge and the author engage in a debate over the compatibility of soft forks without miner enforcement and the causes of chain splits. While the author proposes that the proposed solution is majority hash power enforced, Jorge argues that people change their rules because of coordination mistakes, bugs, or wanting different rules, not because of majority hash power. The compatibility of the proposed solution implies that not everyone is aligned, but regardless of percentage adoption, 60% miners' adoption will not cause a split.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T23:39:17.371980+00:00