Author: Tejaswi Nadahalli 2020-06-30 06:45:09
Published on: 2020-06-30T06:45:09+00:00
In an email exchange on the bitcoin-dev mailing list, ZmnSCPxj responded to a post about the "Myopic Miners" bribery attack. ZmnSCPxj argued that in a mixed population of "myopic" and "non-myopic" miners, the myopic strategy would be dominant and non-myopic miners would not arise in the first place. This dominance results from the fact that myopic miners are effectively deducting the fees earned by non-myopic miners by preventing certain transactions from being confirmable. ZmnSCPxj also noted that even if the non-myopic miners successfully defer certain transactions, myopic miners still have a chance of getting those transactions and their attached fees. Therefore, myopic miners impose costs on their non-myopic competitors that non-myopic miners cannot impose on their myopic competitors. Additionally, in response to a table provided by Dave, ZmnSCPxj argued that we should not be so hasty to call non-myopic strategy "rational." The table showed that even a small amount of "myopic" hashrate and long timeouts makes the bribery attack unlikely to succeed. However, ZmnSCPxj contended that in a mixed population of "myopic" and "non-myopic" miners, a myopic strategy is dominant in the game-theoretic sense and can end up earning more (at the expense of non-myopic miners) and dominating over non-myopic miners.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:34:15.804583+00:00