Author: Stanga 2020-06-30 06:28:58
Published on: 2020-06-30T06:28:58+00:00
In a recent email exchange, Ittay Eyal discusses the concept of 'myopic miners' and how they affect the success rate of bribery attacks. ZmnSCPxj responds by providing concrete statistics on the probability of bribery failing in different scenarios, based on the number of blocks until timeout and the percentage of hashrate controlled by myopic miners. They also raise concerns about measuring the distribution of myopic versus rational hashrate and the potential for miners to mislead each other. Ittay Eyal responds by suggesting that we should not consider non-myopic strategies as inherently 'rational'. They argue that in a mixed population of myopic and non-myopic miners, the myopic strategy is dominant due to the fact that myopic miners effectively deduct fees earned by non-myopic miners by preventing confirmations of certain transactions. Thus, even if some non-myopic miners successfully defer certain transactions, myopic miners still have a chance to earn fees through their own confirmations. As a result, myopic miners impose costs on their non-myopic competitors that cannot be reciprocated.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:33:58.064016+00:00