Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-06-29 18:05:10
Published on: 2020-06-29T18:05:10+00:00
The Myopic Miners bribery attack relies on miners prioritizing their utility at game conclusion instead of myopically optimizing for the next block. The probability of the attack failing is 1-exp(-b*h), where `b` is the number of blocks until timeout and `h` is a percentage of the hashrate controlled by so-called myopic miners. Even a small amount of "myopic" hashrate and long timeouts or modest amounts of hashrate and short timeouts make this attack unlikely to succeed. Additionally, there's the problem of measuring the distribution of "myopic" hashrate versus "rational" hashrate, which may lead to different conclusions about the relative hashrate of "myopic" miners, producing a feedback loop that makes other miners think the rate of "myopic" miners is increasing. In a mixed population of "myopic" and "non-myopic" miners, the myopic strategy is dominant in the game-theoretic sense, imposing costs on non-myopic competitors that non-myopic miners cannot impose on their myopic competitors. If even one myopic miner successfully gets the Alice transaction confirmed, all the non-myopic miners lose out on the Bob bribe fee. Thus, the myopic strategy will be dominant, and non-myopic miners will not arise in the first place.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:35:46.554529+00:00