Author: David A. Harding 2020-06-28 12:15:17
Published on: 2020-06-28T12:15:17+00:00
A recent result concerning HTLC has been shared in a technical report and short post by Stanga via bitcoin-dev. The research discusses a bribery attack that relies on all miners being rational, hence considering their utility at game conclusion instead of myopically optimizing for the next block. If a portion of the miners are myopic and any of them get to create a block during the first T − 1 rounds, that miner would include Alice’s transaction, and Bob’s bribery attempt would have failed. The success probability, therefore, decreases exponentially in T. Additionally, there is the problem of measuring the distribution of "myopic" hashrate versus "rational" hashrate, which is challenging to implement effectively. However, the research concludes that MAD-HTLC is a useful tool that might be particularly desirable in contracts that involve especially high value or especially short timeouts (perhaps asset swaps or payment channels used by traders? ).
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:35:10.052140+00:00