Author: Bastien TEINTURIER 2020-06-25 13:12:56
Published on: 2020-06-25T13:12:56+00:00
The email thread discusses the potential flaws in the assumption that the mempool is a shared resource, and how it can lead to attackers leveraging this fact. It also highlights how Bob may not know that Alice has published her transaction and will end up publishing his timeout tx, unknowingly giving the two preimages to the miners. The email further elaborates on how there is an unhealthy incentive for miners when they receive an HTLC success tx to always wait for the timeout before confirming the transaction, in hope that they'll receive the second preimage and claim the funds for themselves.The paper acknowledges that it doesn't address issues of malicious miners or an attacker colluding with a miner, but honest miners now have an unhealthy incentive regarding HTLC success confirmation. The email thread also discusses bribery proofs for failed attempts as an additional disincentive for attackers, but this could be subject to an inversion of attack where Alice can wait for the timelock to expire and bribe miners to prevent confirmation of Bob's timelocked transaction, getting the Alice hashlocked transaction confirmed. Finally, the thread talks about how LN nodes need to have some commitment to the LN in the form of actual channels, which are valuable, potentially money-earning constructs, and costly to set up.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:37:53.788421+00:00