Author: Nadav Ivgi 2020-06-25 03:26:41
Published on: 2020-06-25T03:26:41+00:00
The email thread discusses the potential of introducing bribery proofs as an additional disincentive to discourage Bob from attacking in MAD-HTLC. These proofs would be gossiped, and lightning network participants could choose not to peer with Bob when they see them. However, this might require some sort of scoring/reputation scheme that makes it harder for Bob to attack with new throw-away identities to be effective. Nadav suggests that Bob could still send these bribery transactions privately to selected miners, but not making them public would greatly reduce the participating miners' confidence that there is enough participating hashpower for the attack to be profitable. ZmnSCPxj argues that current miners discount future possible gains because in the future, they expect to have less hashrate share than right now. The expectation is that new miners will not have different incentives, and this discounting is proportional to the time delay involved. Thus, Alice can offer, at time L - 1, the entire fund, minus 1 satoshi, to miners, which would be a sufficient disincentive to Bob for not attacking in the first place. The thread also discusses the MAD-HTLC model, including its two contracts (Deposit and Collateral) and three redeem paths, based on different scenarios.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:37:38.091527+00:00