Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-06-25 04:04:09
Published on: 2020-06-25T04:04:09+00:00
The Lightning Network protocol developers are considering adding disincentives for attackers. These disincentives could be in the form of bribery proofs for failed attempts. If "honest" users do not reveal their timelocked transactions before reaching the timelock expiry, then it can be proven that an attacker attempted bribery and failed by showing signed timelocked transactions. However, there is a risk of inversion of this attack. Alice can wait for the timelock to expire and bribe miners to prevent confirmation of the Bob timelocked transaction, getting the Alice hashlocked transaction confirmed. There is a risk at around locktime, particularly with "natural" orphaned blocks and short-term chainsplits. Additional complications can be added to mitigate this edge case, but it is less favorable since complexity is worse in general. Serious attackers would use new pseudonyms, making it sufficient for LN nodes to have some commitment in the form of actual channels, which are valuable, potentially money-earning constructs, and costly to set up. Other HTLC-using systems, such as the "SwapMarket" being proposed by Chris Belcher, could use similar disincentivizing. Chris is planning a fidelity bond system for SwapMarket makers, which would mimic the properties of LN channels.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:38:23.608625+00:00