RBF Pinning with Counterparties and Competing Interest



Summary:

In an email conversation between Bastien and ZmnSCPxj, Bastien expresses skepticism about the practicality of achieving accurate control over what parts of a network get what transactions, particularly for off-chain constructions that rely on absolute timeouts. He hopes that such attacks are hard to achieve without cooperation from a subset of miners. ZmnSCPxj proposes using independent pay-to-preimage transactions as a technical solution but Bastien points out that this has incentives issues too. ZmnSCPxj explains that it is technically possible to hide preimage transactions in miners' mempools without their cooperation by releasing two transactions with near-equal fees and relying on nodes at the boundary between those that receive the preimage transaction and the timelock transaction to receive one or the other first and reject the other. However, ZmnSCPxj admits that he is not a mempool expert and his understanding may be incorrect.


Updated on: 2023-06-14T00:34:22.200760+00:00