Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up



Summary:

The Drivechain concept is a sidechain enabling technology that seeks to plug many blockchains into the main chain. This would remove the blocksize limit from "the Bitcoin system," theoretically putting an end to the scalability debate forever. However, the implementation of Drivechain comes with several consequences. One of these is centralization of the Bitcoin network, allowing a 51% coalition or the government behind it to financially profit by confiscating coins. Additionally, it limits user choice of custodians, from any trustworthy exchange down to a single mining cartel under a single set of laws.Moreover, there is a risk that Bitcoins can be confiscated by a government in the same way that financial assets are confiscated within China. While Bitcoin addresses offer some level of pseudo-anonymity, governments continue to invest in blockchain analysis technology, making this feature less effective every day. Hence, Drivechain may create a new digital border where everyone hands over ownership of their Bitcoins to a single mining cartel when they wish to interact with any sidechain.Several on-list objections were also raised regarding the Drivechain concept, such as resource requirements for BMM 'crisis audit,' miner incentives, and miner involvement, along with various clarifying questions. Off-list conversations raised objections surrounding speed, theft, and antifragility. The objection regarding security pointed out that a large mainchain reorg would hit the entire Bitcoin system and de-confirm all transactions, whereas a sidechain-theft would only affect a small portion of the system, creating an asymmetry that harms the generalization of the model.Paul Sztorc, the creator of Drivechain, seeks feedback on his project and introduces the concept of "Blind Merged Mining" to allow SHA256^2 miners to merge-mine these "drivechains." Some people feel that a maximum block size limit is needed to ensure that future total equilibrium transaction fees are non-negligible, but Paul disagrees. He also compares his proposal with a recent "scaling compromise" and explains why his is better.Paul also discusses antifragility and the distinction of layers between a problem with a sidechain that negatively impacts its parent chain and one that only impacts the sidechain users. The second type of problem is actually desirable for innovation. Users can vote with their feet--if the benefits of a sidechain outweigh its risks, some users will send some BTC there. Finally, he addresses the "too popular" objection and suggests capping the quantity of BTC that can be moved to each sidechain.


Updated on: 2023-06-12T02:12:42.069152+00:00