BIP 151

Summary:

The issue of node identity, its proliferation and the implications for network security and privacy is a concern shared by Eric Voskuil. However, it has been pointed out that node identity has already been widely used in various forms such as 'good node' lists, multiple nodes in different locations, infrastructure relying on well-behaving nodes and configuring trusted hosts. It is inevitable that different pieces of the network will make different choices about this. The advantages of BIP 151 include opportunistic encryption, which although does not protect from active attackers, is preferable to just listening in on connections. Additionally, there are optional pre-shared-secret authentication extensions which can improve IP-based authentication and simplify things like SSL tunnels and onion addresses purely used as identity. A non-leaking public key authentication scheme with keys specific to IP addresses can give a TOFU-like security. There is a widespread problem of users operating under false assumptions about the strength of privacy in Bitcoin. This is an issue of education, not avoiding improvements because they may be misunderstood. Contrary to claims that the complexity of the proposed construction is comparable to that of Bitcoin itself, it is simply a diffie-hellman handshake and stream cipher, both very common constructions, that apply to individual connections. There are no consensus risks nor a requirement for coordinated change through the network. The cryptographic code can be directly reused from a well-known project (OpenSSH) and is very small in size. It is suggested that these use cases and their security assumptions should be clearly spelled out in the BIP, and that if there is any misunderstanding, it should be stated clearly that BIP 151 is only a building block for further improvements.

Updated on: 2023-05-19T23:34:14.959706+00:00