Author: Adam Back 2015-06-30 13:12:52
Published on: 2015-06-30T13:12:52+00:00
The author expresses concern about abruptly stopping the first-seen miner and relay policy, stating that it is risky and unpopular. Instead, they suggest deploying full-RBF in an opt-in manner to allow for a smoother transition for people away from the first-seen assumption towards greenaddress (trust-based) and lightning/payment channel solutions. The mid-term solution is to provide fast and secure zero-confirm transactions through the hub and channel model, which are not directly and robustly securable via miner consensus. Prejudging segments of business's weak-reliance on first-seen is discouraged, and instead, the focus should be on improving network security so that they do not have to eat a fraud cost. The author suggests that security may be incrementally improvable via non-spendable relaying of proof of double-spent status, and services that try to measure % of miners by hashrate with the assumption of first-seen that have seen a given transaction first. They ask for thoughts on the simplest way to support an opt-in version of full-RBF.In response to Todd's comments, Harding expresses concern that meddling with successful usage patterns could threaten to have unintended consequences directly opposed to their stated goal of decentralization. He suggests that as nodes deliberately break things and turn the P2P network into a completely unpredictable hodge-podge of relay policies, many more participants may bypass the P2P network entirely. If nodes provided incentives to their neighbors, such as testing peers to see that they actually do relay "standard" transactions, it would have emergent usability benefits for the P2P network as a whole. Todd clarifies that full-RBF is a change that broadens what the P2P network relays and makes it more useful by giving a predictable and uniform method to get transactions to a wider variety of miners with a wider variety of policies.
Updated on: 2023-06-10T01:41:27.842288+00:00