Author: Mike Koss 2012-06-04 20:49:48
Published on: 2012-06-04T20:49:48+00:00
The email thread discusses a potential attack on a mining pool, which involves an attacker earning shares but denying the pool any valid blocks found. The attacker does not have access to the bitcoins earned in the unreported block, and therefore, it is a zero-net-cost attack for the attacker to harm the pool operator. To detect such an attack, one would have to look for "unlucky" miners, which can only be possible after many millions of shares have been earned without a qualifying block. The proposal for fixing this issue would involve creating a scheme where the miner can detect a qualifying hash to earn a share but cannot tell if the hash is for a valid block. This would require a major change to the block structure, which may not be justified at this point since attackers do not have direct monetary gain from this attack.The asymmetric payoff for an attacker depends on the pool's reward scheme. The attacker gains the "hurt the pool" benefit, and some complicated forms can get "bonus" earnings out of the pool. However, the attacker at least does not lose out significantly. Waiting until there is real pain will result in a painful fork; hence planning the fork 1-2 years out would allow people to upgrade on their own before it breaks. Attackers can hurt the pool's "luck factor" and spend the bitcoins they earn to bribe users away using this attack.
Updated on: 2023-06-06T04:54:50.259310+00:00