Author: Lloyd Fournier 2023-07-27 02:54:17+00:00
Published on: 2023-07-27T02:54:17+00:00
There are a few points discussed in the email. Firstly, it is mentioned that lack of knowledge about each 'R' does not prevent Wagner's attack. Secondly, the writer believes that a generic blind signing service is sufficient for performing blinded MuSig, Muig2, FROST or any similar operation without the service being aware. It is stated that a specialized MuSig2 blind singing service is not required to extract MuSig2 compatible shares from it. The solution proposed is to add the MuSig tweak (and/or BIP32 etc) to the key during the blind signing request. The effectiveness of having multiple nonces like in MuSig2 proper is questioned as it does not enhance server security. The focus then shifts to the need for creating a secure blind schnorr signing service, with the mention of some papers by Jonas that provide insights on achieving this. However, the integration of these techniques into the protocol is considered challenging.
Updated on: 2023-08-11T15:35:38.186979+00:00