Blinded 2-party Musig2



Summary:

In the discussion thread, various attacks have been mentioned, including an attack on the nonces and an attack on the challenge c. These attacks cannot be mitigated by proving knowledge of the signing key, also known as proof of possession (PoP). Proving knowledge of the signing key has traditionally been used as a means of preventing unauthorized access or manipulation of data. However, the attacks discussed in this thread are not susceptible to this form of protection. ZmnSCPxj highlighted an attack on the nonces, which are randomly generated numbers used in cryptographic protocols. Nonces serve to prevent replay attacks, where an attacker intercepts and reuses a valid message. However, even if a party proves knowledge of the signing key, a nonce attack can still occur. This means that an adversary could potentially manipulate the nonces and compromise the security of the system. Additionally, another attack mentioned is on the challenge c. The challenge c is a value used in cryptographic protocols to verify the authenticity of a message. While proving possession of the signing key is an important step in ensuring the integrity of the challenge c, it does not prevent an attack on this component. Therefore, even with PoP, an attacker can still exploit vulnerabilities in the challenge c and compromise the security of the system. In summary, the attacks discussed in this thread cannot be prevented by proving knowledge of the signing key. Both the attack on the nonces and the attack on the challenge c are not mitigated by traditional proof of possession mechanisms. It is important for cryptographic protocols to consider these vulnerabilities and implement additional measures to ensure the security and integrity of the system.


Updated on: 2023-07-27T01:57:06.119611+00:00