Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-07-04 20:58:57
Published on: 2020-07-04T20:58:57+00:00
The MAD-HTLC paper analysis shows that, in a scenario where all players are rational and have a greater strategy space, the subgame-perfect-equilibrium strategy for even relatively small fees is to support an attack. The strategy "exclude-Alice-until-timeout-then-include-Bob" results in higher utility than the strategy "include-Alice-Tx-now". It may be helpful to think of this situation in terms of the Prisoner Dilemma game. One way to get around this is to invoke Iterated Prisoner Dilemma, but this requires miners to identify other miners and to act accordingly. However, anonymity is a crucial aspect of Bitcoin mining. Another way is to have a higher system that polices its constituents and ensures that every miner plays "exclude-Alice-until-timeout-then-include-Bob", and punishes "include-Alice-Tx-now". But this would be equivalent to a centralized cartel, which would be the death of Bitcoin anyway, rendering all Bitcoin tokens worthless.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:38:08.504534+00:00