Author: ZmnSCPxj 2020-07-03 10:16:55
Published on: 2020-07-03T10:16:55+00:00
The Lightning Network team is considering a trade-off between an increased to_self_delay parameter and higher fees, with the latter being preferable. However, they predict that fees will not exceed 1%, except in cases of attack or extreme fee spikes. The team also clarifies that the MAD-HTLC argument applies to all channel mechanisms, not just HTLCs, and discusses the vulnerability of timelocked transactions to bribing attacks. While the myopic strategy is likely dominant at stable states, further investigation is required to confirm that MAD-HTLC does not apply. The paper does not address Eltoo, Somsen's atomic swaps, Fournier's atomic swaps, Kanzure's vault proposal, or watchtowers. A better heuristic for determining vulnerability to timelocked bribery may be whether the construction logic assumes "transaction with earlier locktime supersedes transaction with later locktime".
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:36:48.921046+00:00