Author: Tejaswi Nadahalli 2020-07-02 12:22:51
Published on: 2020-07-02T12:22:51+00:00
The email thread discusses the paper's positing that weak miners should adopt the myopic strategy and include the currently valid Alice transaction to gain more than their expected gain. The authors disagree with the MAD-HTLC paper, arguing that there are many miners with sub-1% hashrate around. They also show that when strong miners know weak miners are present, some of their strategies get dominated as well, and they will be forced to include Alice's transaction. The paper assumes that Bob will bribe with the entire channel value, making it difficult for Alice to match Bob's bribe, but she doesn't have to. The authors suggest that a reasonable value of fees and timelock are enough to avoid the attack, and scorching the earth is not necessary.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:36:37.510660+00:00