Author: Chris Stewart 2017-07-13 20:22:02
Published on: 2017-07-13T20:22:02+00:00
Chris Stewart is seeking the opinion of Russell O'Connor or ZmnSCPxj on Lightning bribes. He believes his original BIP could fit this concept well. Paul Sztorc argues that in equilibrium, the coinbase version may be more efficient than the OP_RETURN version. The former involves a single event per N and has N hash commitments and N instances of the ratchet's block counter per block. A miner may want to redeem an OP Bribe when a node operator has BMMed the block but they are likely to negotiate payment through the Lightning Network. Sidechains running in SPV mode know where to find the information they need to discover the longest chain. In the latter version, there are also N hash commitments per block but it requires a spend in the UTXO set and someone needs to select no inputs in a "hollow transaction". Due to Rusty's soft fork rule of only one h* per sidechain per block, sidechains need just a merkle tree path, but they don't necessarily know where it is. They must store extra data to help them find the data's location. Chris Stewart wonders about the replaceability of the bribe transaction if it is the fee on the transaction. Rusty's soft fork rule solves this by including only one slot per sidechain, which incentivizes miners to make the slot count and select the highest fee txn to fill each slot.
Updated on: 2023-06-12T03:03:36.578782+00:00