Author: ZmnSCPxj 2017-07-12 08:50:52
Published on: 2017-07-12T08:50:52+00:00
The email thread discusses the blind merge mining, which seems contradictory to the fact that a block list node is valid only if its block is valid. The sidechain node is responsible for checking the correctness of the sidechain blockchain, starting with the genesis cons-pair hash and updating the current cons-pair for the hash of the OP_RETURN data. A mainchain miner can be bribed to commit to a random number rather than a valid h* block, leading all the sidechain nodes on a random chase to look for the indicated block. The paper "On the instability of Bitcoin without the block reward" suggests that if the block reward no longer exists, miners can profitably attempt to undercut any full blocks. To protect against undercutting attacks in the sidechain, it is necessary to ensure that the sidechain cannot be reorged without the mainchain. The proposal suggests improvements to the OP_BRIBEVERIFY proposal, including removing the necessity of coinbase commitments, verifying a block by keeping a set of sidechain IDs, and not numbering sidechain IDs from 0, 1, 2, 3..., but instead identifying sidechains by, for example, the hash of their names or the hash of their genesis block or whatever. This allows true permissionless creation of sidechains without some authority existing that centrally allocates sidechain IDs.
Updated on: 2023-06-12T02:56:45.357219+00:00