Published on: 2023-01-13T23:46:58+00:00
In an email thread on the Bitcoin-dev mailing list, a user named alicexbt raised concerns about full Replace-by-Fee (RBF) and its impact on coinjoin implementations. Peter Todd criticized Samourai Wallet's technical decisions and questioned Wasabi's privacy issues. The discussion also touched on Samourai's reputation regarding alleged collaboration with chain analysis firms for censorship purposes. However, this claim was considered symbolic and not a significant issue. The overall conversation highlighted privacy and censorship concerns within the Bitcoin community.In another email exchange, David A. Harding and Peter Todd discussed implementing "conflict monitoring" in decentralized coinjoin protocols. Two methods were proposed: running a relay node with a conflict-detection patch or assuming a conflict exists when there are unexplainable failures in new blocks. Both methods can evade attacks without the need for full-RBF. Todd questioned why centralized unconfirmed transaction acceptance services are prioritized over decentralized protocols that provide privacy and security for more users.In a discussion about decentralized coinjoin implementations like Joinmarket, Peter Todd raised the question of how to implement "conflict monitoring". Two methods were suggested: running a relay node with a conflict-detection patch and using Bitcoin Core to identify conflicting transactions in the mempool, or assuming a conflict exists based on low feerates in new blocks. Both methods have their advantages and limitations but can help prevent attacks on coinjoins without relying on full-RBF.The email thread also explained how Full-RBF helps mitigate double-spend DoS attacks by ensuring coinjoin transactions have fees set at a level that allows them to be mined in a reasonable amount of time. The discussion dismissed the opinion of Wasabi due to privacy issues and clarified that Full-RBF does not provide advantages to well-connected mining pools. It was also concluded that attackers can already perform DoS attacks by double-spending inputs in coinjoins, making Full-RBF unnecessary for this particular attack.In another email exchange between Peter Todd and Dave, the necessity of full-RBF was questioned. The discussion revolved around how participants would learn about double-spend attacks and the importance of implementing conflict monitoring systems in protocol software. It was emphasized that such systems can defeat pinning attacks and individual conflicting input attacks without requiring full-RBF.On Twitter, a user asked about getting extra sats to increase fees for coinjoin transactions. Peter Todd clarified that there is no need for extra sats as coinjoin transactions already have fees set at an appropriate level. He dismissed the mention of Whirlpool and criticized Samourai Wallet's technical decisions. The discussion concluded with Todd stating that attackers can already perform DoS attacks on coinjoins by double-spending inputs, rendering Full-RBF unnecessary.In an email exchange, Peter Todd and an unknown recipient discussed the benefits of full-RBF in multi-party protocols like coinjoins. Todd explained that full-RBF allows higher fee transactions to replace lower fee ones, ensuring forward progress and mitigating DoS attacks caused by intentional or unintentional double-spending of low-fee transactions. However, concerns were raised about transaction pinning and the cost difference between using full-RBF and not using it. Despite these concerns, full-RBF was deemed beneficial for multi-party protocols.In a Bitcoin-dev email, David A. Harding expressed confusion about the necessity of full-RBF. Peter Todd explained that without it, people can cause DoS attacks by double-spending inputs with low-fee transactions. Harding proposed creating new transactions without conflicting inputs, but Todd pointed out that participants may not always be aware of the double-spend. Todd also discussed the issue of transaction pinning and highlighted the cost difference between using full-RBF and not using it. He emphasized that full-RBF improves the success rate of automated coinjoin processes and similar protocols.The benefits of full-RBF were questioned in an email from Peter Todd. He argued that without it, intentional and unintentional double-spending attacks can occur, causing DoS attacks on multi-party protocols. However, another participant suggested alternative solutions to these attacks. The cost difference between using full-RBF and not using it was highlighted, with conflicting inputs costing $0.05 and transaction pinning costing $17.00.The absence of full-RBF in Bitcoin raised concerns about tx-pinning attacks. Peter Todd explained that without full-RBF, low-fee transactions can hold up multi-party protocols by double-spending inputs. Full-RBF mitigates this issue by allowing higher fee transactions to replace lower fee ones, ensuring forward progress. Despite concerns about the cost of attacks, full-RBF is considered a valuable improvement for multi-party protocols.
Updated on: 2023-08-02T08:47:30.328458+00:00