Published on: 2018-01-13T06:11:12+00:00
A member of the Bitcoin development community has suggested that encryption headers for LUKS should be written onto disks, even if they are not used. This suggestion came as part of a challenge to "plausible deniability" designers, with the aim of encrypting a 6 TB disk with pseudorandom bytes and testing what happens when the data is searched at US borders.The challenge is based on the belief that a disk filled with pseudorandom data is not inherently suspicious. Encrypted partitions that are filled and later reformatted will contain random bytes, and modern drives often implement fast secure erasure with encryption, resulting in wiped data becoming random noise. Similarly, software disk encryption schemes fill drives with random noise upon reformatting.The author of the article shares their own practice of immediately 'dd' any new hard disk or decommissioned old one with a pseudorandom byte stream, making it indistinguishable from a disk encryption setup. They challenge plausible deniability designers to 'dd' a 6TB disk with pseudorandom bytes and attempt to walk it across the US border until it gets searched.In response to a comment, the author emphasizes the importance of developing appropriate threat models, keeping security systems confidential, and increasing the popularity of network security systems to reduce suspicion. The only shield against plausibility, according to the author, is not seeming like someone who is likely to have much. Plausible deniability is seen as ineffective against sophisticated adversaries possessing both intelligence and patience.The concept of "plausible deniability" is questioned in relation to devices like Trezor. While the objective of plausible deniability is to present an acceptable alternative while hiding the actual, it can backfire by serving as evidence against the user. In legal scenarios where authorities suspect a user of having more cryptocurrency than disclosed, relying on plausible deniability may result in the user being jailed until they reveal the real password.Information does not exist in isolation, and it is crucial to have a privacy practice that leaves no suspicion of owning any Bitcoin. If a user is known or believed to own large amounts of BTC, their "decoy" wallet may provoke a realistic threat response from adversaries. Plausible deniability schemes can lead to serious consequences, as they may expose traces of other wallets on the computer, and network data could tie one's identity to their wallet.The use of "plausible deniability" is also discussed in the context of Trezor's scheme. Users could face jail time for lying to border security if their alternate passwords based on seeds are brute-forced. While passphrases can be long, most users may not fully grasp the risks involved. Instead of relying on plausible deniability, it is suggested to obviate the need for denial altogether. The post highlights that customs agents have access to cross-correlated analysis data, which could result in prolonged detention while hard drives are examined for evidence linking Trezor apps to known addresses.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T22:28:47.059721+00:00