Author: Tamas Blummer 2015-01-23 16:08:50
Published on: 2015-01-23T16:08:50+00:00
In a discussion on January 23, 2015, several individuals discussed the vulnerability of an isolated node being attacked. Alan Reiner mentions a potential attack vector where someone could isolate a node, get the owner to sign away their entire wallet to fees, and then sell it to a mining pool to mine before the owner realizes what has happened. In this scenario, the relay rules are irrelevant and if the attacker can DoS the node for 24 hours, it wouldn't take much mining power to make the attack highly likely to succeed. Tamas Blummer suggests that nodes not relaying excessive fee transactions would reduce the financial risk. Slush adds that in such an attack, the malware may send the transaction directly to the attacker's pool/miner without pushing it to the network.
Updated on: 2023-06-09T15:57:43.011718+00:00