Published on: 2014-01-10T18:50:36+00:00
Peter Todd discusses the concept of merged mining and its potential impact on altcoins. He notes that there are not many mining pools available, but some altcoins like Ixcoin and Devcoin have been lucky enough to receive support from a larger pool. Todd believes that implementing yet another independent altcoin is not the solution, as there are other currencies like local currencies or colored coins that may fit their needs better without the need for extensive resources. He recommends merged mining because it is more secure for both the altcoin and Bitcoin, as well as better for the environment. However, he acknowledges that non-merged mined chains are still more popular, despite being less efficient and secure.The conversation also touches on decentralized consensus systems competing for market share and the potential for attacks from miners of established systems. The survival of altcoins like Devcoin and Ixcoin can be attributed to their luck in receiving support from larger mining pools, leading to concerns over public relations for attackers. The cost of attacking a competitor coin is high, making it unlikely for Bitcoiners to defend their currency against local currency or barter clubs. The discussion extends to the issue of merge mining being insecure and whether the harm caused to participants in the old system outweighs the benefits of the new system.Peter Todd also discusses the situation with Twister, a P2P microblogging platform that has created its own blockchain for registering usernames. He suggests that using Namecoin instead would have been a better option, as it has more support and merging mining could be a solution. However, at present, the hashing power behind Twister is minimal, making it vulnerable to attack. Todd concludes by saying that if a system does not compensate its miners adequately, it will likely be insecure.The conversation between Todd and Jorge Timón revolves around the security of altcoins versus merged mined ones. They discuss the possibility of miners attacking a competitor coin to protect their own interests and investments. They also touch on the issue of proof-of-sacrifice as a security mechanism and the viability of merge-mined altcoins. Todd argues that merge-mining is not secure, but regular mining is not much better either. Timón questions the economics of merged mining and asks for further discussion on the topic.In another discussion, Todd and Luke-Jr debate the security of merged mining. Todd raises concerns about non-majority cryptocurrencies being vulnerable to 51% attacks from attackers who can reuse existing hashing power. He argues that the value of a cryptocurrency is not equal among all miners, and attacking a currency comes with opportunity costs. Luke-Jr disagrees and believes that any non-scam altcoin is safe using merged mining, as attackers would have an incentive to invest in the altcoin instead of attacking it. They also discuss the idea of a merge-mined Zerocoin implementation and the security of Namecoin versus Litecoin.Overall, the discussions highlight the challenges and potential risks associated with merged mining and the security of altcoins. The conversations explore different perspectives on the topic and raise important considerations for the future development and adoption of cryptocurrencies.In a Bitcoin-wizards mailing list, a member suggested that tying an altcoin directly to Bitcoin's proof-of-work would protect it from a 51% attack. However, another member disagreed, pointing out that this would not prevent a 51% attack because attackers could mine a conflicting chain and there is no reasonable way to choose between the two chains without proof-of-something. Solving double spending with proof-of-publication requires a mathematically verifiable majority aligned with the interests of the crypto-coin users. Last summer, a solution was proposed that could detect an attack and determine how many bitcoins needed to be sacrificed to secure the chain.In a January 1st, 2014 email exchange between Peter Todd and Luke-Jr, they discussed the potential security issue of merge-mining for altcoins. Todd argued that merge-mining makes it easy for attackers to perform a 51% attack on altcoins with low hashing power. On the other hand, Luke-Jr disagreed, asserting that any non-scam altcoin is safe using merged mining because attackers would have an interest in investing in the altcoin rather than attacking it. He also stated that merged mining can enhance the security of non-scam altcoins. Todd countered by stating that the value of a cryptocurrency is not equal to all miners. He presented a hypothetical scenario where he creates a merge-mined Zerocoin implementation with an enforced BTC/ZTC exchange rate. In this case, some miners may not agree with enabling better privacy or their local governments may not allow it, making the system vulnerable to attack. However, if the Zerocoin scheme was implemented by embedding ZTC transactions within standard Bitcoin transactions, even without hiding them, attackers would need a 50% majority of hashing power to succeed.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T07:09:46.713350+00:00