Author: Gregory Maxwell 2012-01-31 07:17:07
Published on: 2012-01-31T07:17:07+00:00
The discussion revolves around a potential Sybil attack on the Bitcoin network. The attacker can spin up multiple nodes as tcp forwarders to a system they control, which can capture all of a node's outbound connections. Increasing the number of outbound connections is not a solution because it invites a tragedy of the commons. There is a more scalable solution to add a couple of trusted nodes or a few that are unlikely to be mutually cooperating against the user. A single connection to the 'good' network kills isolation attacks and is a more secure remedy. This approach doesn't explode the network and is preferable than setting the number of outbound connections as high as possible. Checkpoints prevent total fantasy chain, so a sybil attack is mostly but not entirely a DOS risk.
Updated on: 2023-05-18T22:59:00.591352+00:00