Author: Antoine Riard 2023-02-15 03:33:24
Published on: 2023-02-15T03:33:24+00:00
The discussion revolves around the potential positive and negative externalities of an adversary subverting the a priori agreed upon feerate in dual-funding proposals. While there is a potential for a positive externality for a party wishing to get some witness data confirmed in a block while paying less than the market rate, there is also a potential negative externality in the context of time-sensitive contracts where the adversary can delay confirmation of the funding transaction and double-spend a funding input based on the outcome progression. The use of miniscript embedded in the backend of a Lightning implementation can restrain a counterparty from downgrading its feerate contribution. While full RBF effectively prevents timevalue DoS inflicted to the most-utxo-value contributor in dual-funding, it requires incentive compatible multiparty transactions or the closest approximation of incentive compatibility possible barring future soft forks. However, none of the currently deployed protocols are in any way vulnerable to such attacks, and full RBF is required for incentive-compatible multiparty transactions.
Updated on: 2023-06-16T15:26:34.040215+00:00