Author: Gleb Naumenko 2023-02-02 08:40:04
Published on: 2023-02-02T08:40:04+00:00
The post discusses the game-theoretic security of time-sensitive protocols if miners are open to censorship for a reward. The author talks about the case when a significant hashrate is open to take bribes, but miners don't trust each other, and there are no reorgs. The post explores different constructions such as opcode-based construction, nLockTime-based construction, nLockTime-based construction with OP_CSV output, anchor outputs, and lightning. To increase the attack bar, the author suggests sticking to the nLockTime-based construction with OP_CSV output or using anchor outputs while enforcing a way to steal/burn the external fee if it's an attack or designing new fee/channel constructions. The post also provides references to related work in the field.
Updated on: 2023-05-22T23:27:14.692795+00:00