Author: Jeremy Rubin 2022-02-19 00:38:27
Published on: 2022-02-19T00:38:27+00:00
The discussion in this context revolves around a new type of pinning attack that is distinct from other types of pinning attacks. The term "pinning" is formally defined as sequences of transactions that prevent or hinder the progress in terms of units of computation proceeding. The writer posits that something that only increases the possibility to make progress cannot be pinning and suggests calling it "necromancing." However, he argues that necromancy should not be a concern since a protocol that is particularly vulnerable to it is insecure, and Bitcoin's forward progress should not be hampered on secure applications to service already insecure ones. Lightning is necromancy-resistant by design but pinning-vulnerable, while coinjoins are necromancy-resistant but pinning-vulnerable.The writer also explains that necromancy is not uniquely un-present in Bitcoin today and that things like package relay and elimination of pinning are inherently at odds with making necromancy for CPFP use cases. He further clarifies that a third party can only accelerate the mining on the timestamp transactions, but they can accelerate the mining of any such timestamp transaction. If a person wants to shift back one block earlier, they can offer a higher fee for the later RBF'd calendar, and thus, the interference is limited by how much they wish to pay to guarantee their commitment is in this block as opposed to the next.Moreover, the writer mentions that out-of-band transaction fees can already be done to a similar effect. Lastly, if a person gets "necromanced" on an earlier RBF'd transaction by a third party for OTS, they should be relatively happy since the undoing of their later RBF surely returned some satoshis to their wallet.
Updated on: 2023-06-15T03:56:59.729155+00:00