Author: Tim Ruffing 2018-02-15 23:44:19
Published on: 2018-02-15T23:44:19+00:00
In a discussion thread, Natanael suggested publishing the full transaction except for public keys and signatures, committing to it, and revealing it later to prevent attackers from modifying the transaction. However, this approach can become a target for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as anyone can flood miners with invalid transaction commitments, which cannot be pruned until a valid transaction is finalized. Rate limiting is not considered safe, but requiring transaction fees even for commitments may be a solution, although impractical. The practicality of such solutions depends on various parameters, including the efficiency of zero-knowledge proof systems. The use of zero-knowledge proofs to recover an UTXO with a P2PKH address seems plausible, but it can be complex and challenging for arbitrary scripts, even with fast proof systems and machines.
Updated on: 2023-06-13T00:30:17.223046+00:00