Author: Henning Kopp 2016-02-10 11:53:45
Published on: 2016-02-10T11:53:45+00:00
In this email conversation, Jeremy Papp and Henning Kopp discuss confidential transactions. Jeremy suggests that the blinding factor can be included in the extra data which is incorporated into the ring signatures used in the range proof. He believes that the range proof is optional for single output transactions since there's only one possible value that it can be to make the whole thing work. However, he is unsure how to transmit it. They both agree that adding extraneous data isn't much of a problem since using it will pretty much require segwit. In addition, they imagine that the blinding factor would be protected from outside examination via some form of shared secret generation. This would require the sender to know the recipient's unhashed public key, but they don't know of any shared secret schemes that will work on hashed keys. Henning asks how the receiver of the transaction can check which amount was sent to him. He thinks that the receiver needs to learn the blinding factor to reveal the commit somehow off-chain. Henning is from Ulm University in Germany.
Updated on: 2023-06-11T03:53:59.256906+00:00