Author: Peter Todd 2014-02-07 09:21:41
Published on: 2014-02-07T09:21:41+00:00
The provided context is related to digital signatures and encryption in the Bitcoin community. Mike Hearn released bitcoinj 0.11 with issues that included a truncated Git commit hash and incomplete PGP fingerprint. Several people contacted him with solutions, including Peter Todd who wrote summaries of the solutions offered. Todd explained that the truncated Git commit hash can be exploited by attackers using partial pre-image attacks, and an attacker can modify the bitcoinj source code to generate private keys insecurely and ensure that the last 48 bits of the commit hash match Hearn's message. Another issue was the omission of the key fingerprint, making it difficult for users to verify its authenticity.The moral of the story is that if a second-pre-image attack is a threat, then at least 128 bits should be used. The Bitcoin Core development effort consists of multiple people mutually verifying each other’s work and signing code with OpenPGP keys that are verifiable via different paths. However, without additional information or context, it is challenging to provide a more detailed summary or explanation of the technical aspects involved.
Updated on: 2023-06-08T02:19:03.870217+00:00