Author: John Carvalho 2022-12-10 12:10:24
Published on: 2022-12-10T12:10:24+00:00
The author questions the term "incentive-compatible" and its application to Bitcoin transactions. They argue that relying on higher fees as a means of ensuring incentive compatibility is theoretical and not objective. In fact, RBF, which serves as a fee-minimization tool, appears to be anti-incentives since miners aim for maximum fees per block and lifetime. The author suggests that designs that fill blocks and do not facilitate bidding on replacement use cases would be more beneficial. Instead of enforcing protocol, the market should be allowed to dictate incentives and yield the most hashpower. The author argues for a user-compatible design that gives users the flexibility to express their intent in various ways. They emphasize the importance of respecting dynamics when making decisions and not prioritizing one user type over another.
Updated on: 2023-05-22T23:05:16.702091+00:00