Author: Bob McElrath 2021-12-15 00:12:00
Published on: 2021-12-15T00:12:00+00:00
The argument is about Bitcoin pools, where the window function cannot be used to hedge hashrate. Various suggestions below introduce dangerous new games that might be played by miners. The half-baked design posted is less than useless and doesn't do anything that anyone wants. Jeremy [jlrubin at mit.edu] points out that pooling is a general technique for aggregating resources to accomplish something. One of the benefits of sub-block pooling is that it can help with micro-pools being able to split resources non-custodially in every block as a part of the higher order DCFMP. It's also possible to add an 'uncle block' type mechanism in an incentive compatible way such that there's an incentive to include the heaviest ones that are worth further study and consideration. With respect to space usage, Bob McElrath wholly rejects the viability of a payment pool mechanism to cut-through chain space. This proposal is simple when taken in a broader context. Non-Interactive Channels and Payment Pools are useful by themselves, so are the operations to merge them and swap balance across them. Therefore most of the complexity in this proposal is relying on tools we'll likely see in everyday use in any case, DCFMP or no. The argument is that instead of trying to justify CTV by making it be all things to all people, one should pick ONE problem for which CTV is demonstrably the right and best solution.
Updated on: 2023-06-15T03:35:40.133438+00:00