Author: ZmnSCPxj 2017-12-07 07:28:03
Published on: 2017-12-07T07:28:03+00:00
The article discusses the potential outcomes of implementing a strategy to undercut competitors by upvoting only your own withdrawals and downvoting those of your competitors, assuming there are three large mining groups with roughly 33% of total hashpower each. In this scenario, no withdrawal would ever push through and drivechains stabilize to one-way pegs. If two of the mining pools collude, they can decide to outright make an invalid withdrawal of all funds, split up in half between themselves. The article also notes that three exactly equal mining pools are unnatural. If there are three mining pools with slightly different percentages of hashpower, those three pools cannot safely let the others withdraw funds, as one or two pools may be pressured to sell their sidecoins for a discount to the joint coalition, which lowers the profitability of the weaker pool(s), causing grinders to leave them in favor of the stronger pool(s). Ultimately, all miners may decide to collude together and put all their withdrawals into a single withdrawal proposal, but this removes any check-and-balance that the single withdrawal proposal is truthful to the sidechain. As a result, the single coalition of miners can decide to just steal all sidechain funds and reassign them in proportion to their hashpower, which is a theft risk if the sidechain is operating normally.
Updated on: 2023-06-12T22:31:17.089450+00:00