Author: Jonathan Toomim 2015-12-29 19:08:16
Published on: 2015-12-29T19:08:16+00:00
The debate around block selection mechanisms continues among the Bitcoin community. Self-interested miners tend to build on the block that leaves the most transaction fees available, typically the smallest block. The question arises whether Core's default behavior should be rational behavior or altruistic behavior regarding block selection and the "same time" threshold. If the blocksize limit were increased significantly, a selfish miner's behavior may become preferable as it would also be fail-safe. On December 29, 2015, Dave Scotese proposed an alteration to the block-selection mechanism in response to the profitability of withholding block solutions. The proposal suggests using "nearly the same time" to mean separated in time by the average duration of block propagation times and building on the block that has the most old BTCDD (BitcoinDaysDestroyed) when two block solutions come in at nearly the same time. The goal is to reduce the chances of a recently solved block orphaning one solved a while ago, which is becoming an increasingly growing problem. Propagation effects between large and small miners are more concerning, particularly if you are in an environment where selfish mining is possible. Peter Todd raised concerns about the profitability difference between small and large miners without attacks going on, making selfish mining a worry even with anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures. Meanwhile, Ivan Brightly questioned why focus on network bandwidth when electricity contracts or vertically integrated chip manufacturers are more significant factors in mining profitability. Despite the ongoing debate, no consensus has been reached yet.
Updated on: 2023-06-11T02:29:37.458670+00:00