Author: Christian Decker 2020-08-04 10:38:20
Published on: 2020-08-04T10:38:20+00:00
In this context, Christian discusses a feasible attack that can be executed without the victim's knowledge in a Lightning universe primarily utilizing `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`-based mechanisms. He suggests that monitoring on-chain events and ignoring mempool events would suffice for the victim to react to on-chain confirmed transactions. To ensure safety of the protocol, timeouts need to be chosen carefully to allow timely reaction to any misbehavior. Additionally, the possibility of implementing a "scorch-the-earth, keep-bumping-the-fee" strategy is also discussed as a way to react to outdated updates by overriding them with a new update-settlement pair. Although being able to react early to transactions in the memory pool can be a nice addition, it is not strictly required for the safety of the protocol.
Updated on: 2023-06-14T02:51:57.990841+00:00