Published on: 2015-08-27T15:09:18+00:00
The proposal suggests replacing the fixed maximum block size with a dynamically controlled maximum block size that may increase or decrease based on various network factors. There are two proposals presented in the document. Proposal 1 depends only on the previous block size calculation, while Proposal 2 depends on both the previous block size calculation and the previous Tx fee collected by miners. The rationale behind each solution is explained in detail. The document notes that this is a hard-forking change to the Bitcoin protocol, and anyone running code that fully validates blocks must upgrade before the activation time or risk rejecting a chain containing larger-than-one-megabyte blocks. Other solutions considered are also mentioned. If consensus is achieved, deployment can be made at a future block number at which difficulty will change.A member of the bitcoin-dev mailing list, Hector Chu, proposed using CLTV (CheckLockTimeVerify) to lock coins as a better alternative to counting votes from UTXO set. However, if a soft-fork to implement CLTV is not feasible, counting votes from the UTXO set is still an acceptable option, albeit less strong evidence of commitment. Peter Todd suggested a toy example of XORing a vote with SHA256 of the entire blockchain, but it was deemed ineffective by Hector Chu.In a discussion on bitcoin-dev, Peter Todd proposed XORing votes with SHA256 of the entire blockchain as a simple toy example of voting mechanism. However, this proposal was criticized for not being effective. In response to this, another proposal was made by an unknown individual to use CLTV to lock coins (votes), which was considered to be better than the previous proposal. In case a soft-fork cannot be implemented in time, counting votes from the UTXO set is also considered to be acceptable, but it may not provide strong evidence of commitment like CLTV.In a Bitcoin development discussion, Simon Liu raised concerns about the feasibility of implementing a rule where one user can only have one vote. He asked how to prevent a user running multiple nodes. Chun Wang answered that the vote would not be counted by nodes but by bitcoin amount or coin-days, working like proof-of-stake. Peter Todd added to the discussion that to implement a vote where only users with access to a full node can vote, part of the vote would need to be determined by a non-miner-committed value calculatable by anyone with a full node. He gave an example of XORing a vote with SHA256(the entire blockchain).In a discussion on the bitcoin-dev mailing list, Simon Liu raised concerns about a voting system for users that could be exploited by those running multiple nodes. In response, it was clarified that the proposed system would not count votes based on nodes, but instead on bitcoin amount or coin-days, similar to a proof-of-stake model. It was suggested that a combination of proof-of-work and proof-of-stake would be optimal for such a system.Bitcoin is not a democracy. The proposal to vote on what goes into a particular Github repository is ultimately controlled by those with the control of that repository. Bitcoin is an anarchy by design, and people will use whatever they want. While stakeholders could be allowed to vote on the determination of the max block-size limit, it is likely to result in very low-quality results and drastically low participation, similar to rational ignorance. The default mechanism for change would be forking off altcoins and allowing the market to decide which coin is most valuable.In a discussion on the bitcoin-dev mailing list, Peter Todd proposed an idea of creating a voting mechanism in which only users with access to validating nodes would be able to vote. However, some concerns were raised regarding this proposal. One concern was that if the rule is that one user can only have one vote, how do you prevent a user running multiple nodes? Another concern was how to verify that a node is indeed a fully validating node with its own copy of the blockchain. Despite these concerns, the idea of designing a voting mechanism for Bitcoin's governance remains an interesting concept to explore.The discussion is about an approach to give the economic majority of coin holders a vote for the maximum block size. However, it is questioned what fraction of coin holders would vote and how many have the technical knowledge to make an informed choice. The comparison is made to polling Toyota truck owners on whether the 2017 Tacoma should increase its engine's cylinder displacement by 10%, which would not result in meaningful votes from ordinary users. The idea of allowing altcoins to determine the max block-size limit through market mechanisms is mentioned as a default mechanism for change, but it is not the least painful mechanism. The voters are unlikely to cast informed votes, and the vote is likely to have little participation and low-quality results. Nonetheless, stakeholder vote is considered important to check on miners' power.In a discussion thread on Bitcoin-dev mailing list, Peter Todd proposed an approach to give the economic majority of coin holders a vote for the max blocksize.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T15:40:50.535299+00:00