Author: Mark Friedenbach 2015-08-29 00:29:23
Published on: 2015-08-29T00:29:23+00:00
The discussion in this context is about the proposal of allowing miners to vote on block size. However, it is noted that having miners or any group vote on block size is not an intrinsically good thing. The original proposal by Greg Maxwell and others was not a mechanism for voting but rather a feedback control that made the maximum block size that which generated the most fees. Jorge Timón realizes that what Mark Friedenbach proposed is just miner's voting on block size but paying with higher difficulty when they vote for bigger blocks. He believes that miners should not decide on the consensus rule to limit mining centralization. If the hashing majority is perfectly fine with the mining centralization at that point in time, then a soft fork won't be useful, and it could result in an "anti-miner fork." He thinks that allowing miners to vote on the rule to limit mining centralization is a terrible idea, as it is similar to letting pharma companies write regulations on new drug safety, big food chains deciding on minimum food controls, or car manufacturers deciding on indirect taxes for fuel. Therefore, he dislikes both the proposal and BIP100.
Updated on: 2023-06-10T20:55:22.546149+00:00