Author: Corey Haddad 2015-08-12 01:56:00
Published on: 2015-08-12T01:56:00+00:00
The discussion on the Bitcoin-dev mailing list raises concerns over the need for Bitcoin to survive active censorship. It is important for Bitcoin to be able to run a node even in the face of a hostile ISP or government, and to be location independent and able to move around. The higher the bandwidth requirements, the fewer the number of ISPs that are available to service users, which makes them more visible. It may also be necessary to be able to run over Tor or I2P, which could be developed, serviced or supported by future governments who have turned hostile towards it. The credible threat of being able to operate underground keeps Bitcoin from being repressed. However, some argue that this threat is already inherent since smart governments know that Bitcoin-like systems can operate over Tor and I2P, without central servers, and can be run on commodity hardware without detection. It is important to accurately assess the level of threat that Bitcoin faces from regulation, legislation, and government operations. In light of the current regulatory climate surrounding Bitcoin, the best security against a state-sponsored or political crackdown comes from growing the user base and use cases, as opposed to hardening and fortifying the protocol. Recent improvements in Tor routing are an example of a security improvement that does not slow Bitcoin's potential growth. 8 MB blocks might cause some centralization and make the network slightly more vulnerable to government attack, but if millions more people are able to join the system, the overall security situation would be stronger due to decreased risk of attack.
Updated on: 2023-06-10T18:29:57.822677+00:00